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INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND
Damage awards in private actions under section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act or 1934 Act)' and
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule lOb-5 promulgated
thereunder2 may be either an area where flexibility, pragmatism, and
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See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1997). Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act specifically
provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or
of any facility of any national securities exchange . . . [t]o use or

employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.., any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.
Id.
2 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998).
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
Rule lOb-5, first promulgated in 1942, now provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or
of any facility of any national securities exchange,
a. To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
b. To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit
to state a material fact in order to make the statement made, in
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
c. To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
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justice prevail or "a confused area of the law where the courts, forced
to rely on their own wits, have created a myriad of approaches."3 Or
perhaps both descriptions are accurate and together render a more
complete description of the state of the law of compensatory damages
under Rule lOb-5. The reader will have to judge for himself. In any
event, there is no clear rule guiding the measure of damages under
4
Rule lOb-5 and hence little predictability for counsel or the client.
The genesis of this lack of guidance and predictability lies with
the legislature and the provisions of the 1934 Act. Some sections of
this statute, such as sections 9(e) 5 and 18(a), 6 contain express
provisions for damages as do sections 11(e)' and 12(a)8 of the
Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act or 1933 Act). But neither
section 10(b) nor Rule lOb-5 contains such express damage
provisions. It thus has been left to the courts to create a body of law
fashioning damage remedies under Rule lOb-5.
In the following sections we will first address Exchange Act
section 28(a)," the statutory provision that the United States Supreme
Court has interpreted as governing the measure of damages that are
permissible under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.' o Second, we will
analyze the two Supreme Court cases, Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States" and Randall v. BJ Loftsgaarden12 which set guideposts for
flexibility and pragmatism and ultimately perhaps for confusion and
unpredictability in determining the proper measure of damages

operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.

Id.
Koch v. Koch Indus., Inc., 6 F. Supp.2d 1192, 1201 (D. Kan. 1998).
See Michael J. Kaufman, No Foul, No Harm: The Real Measure of Damages Under
Rule lOb-5, 39 CATH. U. L. REv. 29, 34 (1989);John H. Matheson, Corporate Disclosure
Obligations and the Parameters of Rule lOb-5: Basic Inc. v. Levinson and Beyond, 14J.
COPP. L. 1, 29-31 (1988).
5 See 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1997).
6 See 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a)
(1997).
7 See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e)
(1997).
8 See 15 U.S.C. § 771(a) (1997).
4

See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1997).
10 See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972) ("In our
view the correct measure of damages under § 28 of the Act... is the difference

between the fair value of all that the.., seller received and the fair value of what he
could have received had there been no fraudulent conduct .... "); Randall v. B.J.
Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 664 (1986) ("[T]his court has noted that Section 28(a)
of the 1934 Act... limits recovery in any private damages action brought under the
1934 Act to actual damages.") (internal quotations omitted).
1 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
H 478 U.S. 647
(1986).
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under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Third, we will discuss certain
leading decisions in the federal circuit and district courts which in
the great variety of damage measures applied reflect the lack of a
clear mandate for a specific Rule 10b-5 damage measure from either
the legislature or the Supreme Court. Fourth, we will address
selected federal district court decisions that harshly criticize this lack
of mandate and lament the "set of unsupportable assumptions and
arbitrary rules that result in irrational damage awards" under Rule
10b-5.' Lastly, we will analyze Exchange Act section 21D(e),"4 enacted
as part of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. '5
Damages in customer cases against broker-dealers are rarely
discussed because most of these cases are now decided in arbitration
without written decisions so there is little recorded precedent. As a
result, and combined with the more general equitable standards
sometimes used in arbitration,'6 damage measures in arbitration are,
in the Authors' experience, even more diverse than in court cases.
Damages are not available to the SEC in its enforcement actions.
But it can obtain
monetary relief in the form of equitable
7
disgorgement.'
I.

APPLICABLE STATUTE

As stated above, neither section 10(b) nor Rule lOb-5 contains
any express provision for damages. Faced with this situation, the first
time the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of the
measure of damages under Rule 10b-5, the Court appears to have
assumed, without any analytical reasoning, that Exchange Act section
28(a)"' was the applicable provision.'' Subsequent decisions have
followed the Supreme Court's assumption, also without any analytical
reasoning2 ° Exchange Act section 28(a) reads in relevant part:
1 In re Clearly Canadian Sec. Litig., Nos. C-93-1037-VRW, C-93-1278-VRW, C-934313-VRW, C-95-0699-VRW, C-95-2295-VRW, 993, 1999 WL 707737 at *5 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 3,1999).
4 See 15 U.S.C. § 7 8u-4(e) (1997).
IS See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (1999).
16
See Karen Halverson, Arbitration and The Civil Rights Act of 1991, 67 U. CIN. L.
REv. 445, 449 (1999) (finding that arbitrators often decide disputes according to
"equitable principles instead of legal rules").
17
See Stephanie F. Barkholz, Comment, Insider Trading, the Contemporaneous
Trader, and the Corporate Acquirer: Entitlement to Profits Disgorged by the SEC, 40 EMORY
L.J. 537, 563 (1991) (explaining that disgorgement is a remedy available in an action
initiated by the SEC).
is See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1997).
19 SeeAffiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,
406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972).
21) See discussion infra Part III (discussing opinions
of circuit courts of appeals and
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"[N]o person permitted to maintain a suit for damages under the
provisions of this title shall recover, through satisfaction of judgment
in one or more actions, a total amount in excess of his actual
damages on account of the act complained of."2 At the time of the
Affiliated Ute decision, the quoted language was part of a cumulative
remedies section captioned "Effect on Existing Law" and contained
the only general reference to damages in the statute. 22 The meaning
of the term "actual damages" is not clear, and there is no indication
or even hint in section 28(a) regarding the proper measure or theory
of damages to be used in determining "actual damages" in a
particular case. Therefore, it has been left to the federal courts to
provide a response on a case-by-case basis. 3
II. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

The United States Supreme Court has issued two important
decisions addressing the measure of damages under Rule 10b-5:25

24
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States and Randall v. B.J. Loftsgaarden.
First, we will discuss Affiliated Ute and then we will examine Randall.
26
Although Affiliated Ute involved damages to sellers and Randall
damages to buyers their principles can be applied to either kind of
plaintiff. But sellers are in a better position than buyers to obtain
windfall damages, as discussed below.
In Affiliated Ute, mixed-blood Indians sought damages against a
bank, two of its employees, and the United States for alleged
securities law violations in connection with the sales by plaintiffs of
their shares in a corporation created to manage interests in tribal
assets not susceptible to equitable and practicable distribution under
the Ute Indian Supervision Termination Act. 2" The bank employees
were assistant managers of the bank, which served as transfer agent
for the corporation.2 " The employees were found to have violated
Rule lOb-5 by making misstatements of material fact, namely that the
prevailing market price for the plaintiffs' shares was the figure at

district courts).
21 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1997).
2
See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (1997).
2A See Analisa F. Sama, Note, 18 SETON HALL L. REv. 124, 134 (1988) (finding that
the calculation of actual damages is often left to the discretion of the federal courts).
24 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
25 478 U.S. 647 (1986).
26 See Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S.
at 153.
27 See Randal 478 U.S. at 650.
28 See Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 135.
29 See id. at 146.
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which their sales were made. In fact, higher prices prevailed among
non-Indian buyers.'
The Supreme Court did not require reliance upon the
misrepresentations in order to find liability."' All that was necessary
was that the facts withheld be material in the sense that a reasonable
investor might have considered them important in the making of his
decision.32 The bankers had encouraged a non-Indian market,
solicited and accepted standing buy orders from non-Indians,
received deposits from prospective non-Indian buyers so purchase
funds would be on hand, and encouraged Indians to sell. The bank's
liability was held to be co-extensive with that of its employees.: ' With
respect to measuring the damages to be awarded to plaintiffs, the
Supreme Court wrote:
In our view, the correct measure of damages under § 28 of the
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a), is the difference between the fair value
of all that the mixed-blood seller received and the fair value of
what he would have received had there been no fraudulent
conduct . .. except for the situation where the defendant
received more than the seller's actual loss. In the latter case
damages are the amount of the defendant's profit.

It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court has combined
two different measures of damages in an effort to reach a fair result.
The difference between the fair value of what the seller in fact
received and the fair value of what the seller would have received had
there been no fraud is often denominated as the out-of-pocket
measure of damages.
As we shall see, the courts usually pay lip
service to this damages measure as the most common measure of
damages in a private action under Rule lOb-5 and cite the Supreme
Court's language in Affiliated Ute as authority. ' In Affiliated Ute, the
Supreme Court combined this out-of-pocket measure with an
exception for the situation in which the defendant, presumably upon
resale, received profits in excess of the seller's actual loss: Here the

"' See id. at 148.

See id. at 152-53.
id. at 153-54.

'12 See

3' See id. at 154.

Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 155 (citing Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 748 (8th Cir.
1967);janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir. 1965)).
.1 See Kaufman, supra note 4, at 72 ("[T]he out-of-pocket rule

. . .

measures the

disparity between fair value paid and received at the time of sale.").
See, e.g., DCD Programs Ltd. v. Leighton, 90 F.3d 1442, 1446 (9th Cir. 1996);
Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 482 (5th Cir. 1981).
.17For example, one court noted
that
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damages would be the amount of the defendant's profit. This
measure of damages, while employed much less frequently by the
courts than the out-of-pocket measure, is often denominated as the
windfall measure of damages and sometimes as a constructive trust,
unjust enrichment, or disgorgement measure."
The Supreme Court concluded its opinion in Affiliated Ute by
finding that the district court's valuation of $1500 for each share sold
by plaintiffs had sufficient support in the record. 3 The Supreme
Court's enumeration of the factors that determined this valuation is
interesting for its broad mix of factors, some intrinsic to the security
4
sold and others relating to the situation and conduct of the parties. 0
The Court wrote:
In arriving at the $1,500 figure the District Court considered the
existence of extensive oil shale deposits on the reservation; the
possession by those deposits of substantial present value and of
great potential value; the presence of gas, coal, and other
minerals; the administrative cost deposit retained by the United
States with respect to each member of the tribe; each petitioner's
remaining interest in the 1965 award by the Indian Claims
Commission; the existence of claims against the United States not
yet fully adjudicated; and the specific prices at which UDC [Ute
Distribution Corporation] shares were sold by mixed-bloods and

between white persons. The court noted that prices paid for the
shares were somewhat influenced by the improper activities of
Gale and Haslem [bank employees]; by the excess of sellers over
buyers; by the fact the typical Indian seller was not so well
informed about the potential value of the stock as was the typical
non-Indian buyer; by the fact that the Indian seller was under
heavy economic pressure to sell; by opinion evidence as to worth

in excess of $700 per share; and by the fact that some portion of
the depressant factors in the market was attributable to the
defendants. On the other hand, the court noted that not all the
market's depressant factors were so attributable to the defendants

and that the tribe itself, despite the opportunity so to do, had
[w]hile "actual damages" has been most often translated as "out of
pocket loss," Section 28(a) has been interpreted so as to allow a
defrauded buyer to choose rescission instead of the difference between
the value of what he gave up and the value of what he received, and to
allow a defrauded seller to recover any profits that the buyer has made
on resale.
Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 392 F. Supp. 740, 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
M See Nashville Lodging Co. v. Resolution Trust Co., 59 F.3d 236, 246 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (describing several measures of available damages).
." See Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 156.
40

See id. at 155-56.
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declined to purchase UDC shares at prices ranging from $350 to
$700. 4'
Randall v. B.J. Loftsgaarden4" further emphasized the theme of
flexibility with respect to damage remedies under Rule 10b-5
exhibited in Affiliated Ute. In Randa4 the Supreme Court held that
damages awarded to investors in a fraudulent tax shelter who sued
43
under Securities Act section 12(2) (now 12(a) (2))
and Exchange
Act section 10(b) need not be offset by any tax savings realized from
the investment." First, the Court addressed the specific language of
Securities Act section 12(2) and found that that section does not
permit the offset of tax benefits from its rescission measure of
damages either as "income received" or as a return of
"consideration." 4 The Court then turned its attention to the "actual
damages" limitation of Exchange Act section 28(a) and declined to
read section 28(a) as mandating a different result.4 The Supreme
Court's opinion, however, illustrates a number of threads or themes
that emphasize flexibility in applying a measure of damages under
Rule 10b-5.
The following excerpt from the Randall opinion emphasizes
flexibility in (1) assuming that a rescissory rather than out-of-pocket
measure of damages may be applied under section 28(a) and Rule
10b-5; (2) rejecting a rigid interpretation of section 28(a), which
requires that every recovery on an express or implied right of action
under the 1934 Act must be limited to the net economic harm
,puffered by the plaintiff; (3) emphasizing Affiliated Ute's flexibility in
combining a "windfall" with an "out-of-pocket" measure of damages
in interpreting section 28(a) to prevent defendant's unjust
enrichment; and (4) contrasting the section 28(a)-Rule 10b-5
flexible damages remedy with the more rigid, circumscribed damages
remedy of Securities Act Section 12 (2).
The issue whether and under what circumstances rescission or a
rescissory measure of damages is available under §10(b) is an
unsettled one. In Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States.... which
involved violations of §10(b) and Rule lOb-5 by a buyer of
securities, this Court held that ordinarily "the correct measure of
damages under §28 of the Act.... is the difference between the

41

Id.

42 478 U.S. 647
43 See 15 U.S.C.
44
45
46

(1986).
§ 771(a) (2) (1997).
See Randal, 478 U.S. at 656.
See id.at 657-58.
See id. at 663.
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fair value of all that the [plaintiff] received and the fair value of
what he would have received had there been no fraudulent
conduct." Courts have also generally applied this "out-of-pocket"
measure of damages in §10(b) cases involving fraud by a seller of
securities.... But there is authority for allowing the §10(b)
plaintiff, at least in some circumstances, to choose between
"undoing the bargain (when events since the transaction have not
made rescission impossible) or holding the defendant to the
bargain by requiring him to pay [out-of-pocket] damages." [See,
e.g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 909 (9th Cir. 1975) ("While
out of pocket loss is the ordinary standard in a 10b-5 suit, it is
within the discretion of the district judge in appropriate
circumstances to apply a rescissory measure .... 1.
Respondents do not dispute that rescission or a rescissory
measure of damages may sometimes be appropriate under
§10(b), nor do they dispute that in this case a rescissory recovery
is appropriate on petitioners' §10(b) claims as well as on their
§12(2) claims. Instead, they contend that §28(a) strictly limits any
such rescissory recovery to the plaintiff's net economic harm. We
shall therefore assume, arguendo, that a rescissory recovery may
sometimes be proper on a §10(b) claim, and that this is such a
case.
In enacting §28(a), Congress did not specify what was meant by
.actual damages." It is appropriate, therefore, to look to "the
state of the law at the time the legislation was enacted" for
guidance in defining the scope of this limitation.... When §28(a)
was enacted §12(2) stood as a conspicuous example of a rescissory
remedy, and we have found that Congress did not intend that a
recovery in rescission under §12(2) be reduced by tax benefits
received. Accordingly, we think §28(a) should not be read to
compel a different result where rescissory damages are obtained
under §10(b).
Even apart from the analogy furnished by §12(2), this Court has
never interpreted §28(a) as imposing a rigid requirement that
every recovery on an express or implied right of action under the
1934 Act must be limited to the net economic harm suffered by
the plaintiff. To be sure, this Court has noted [in Blue Chip Stamps
v. ManorDrug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 734 (1975)] that "Section 28(a)
of the 1934 Act... limits recovery in any private damages action
brought under the 1934 Act to 'actual damages'" [and] Affiliated
Ute Citizens clearly interpreted §28(a) as governing the measures
of damages that are permissible under §10(b).... But the Court
in Affiliated Ute Citizens also indicated that "where the defendant
received more than the seller's actual loss ...damages are the
amount of the defendant's profit." ... This alternative standard
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aims at preventing the unjust enrichment of a fraudulent buyer,
and it clearly does more than simply make the plaintiff whole for
the economic loss proximately caused by the buyer's fraud.
Indeed, the accepted rationale underlying this alternative is
simply that "[i]t is more appropriate to give the defrauded party
the benefit even of windfalls than to let the fraudulent party keep
them."... Thus, the mere fact that the receipt of tax benefits,
plus a full recovery under a rescissory measure of damages, may
place a §10(b) plaintiff in a better position than he would have
been in absent the fraud, does not establish that the flexible limits
of §28(a) have been exceeded. 7
Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion emphasized the
difference in measure of damages between a case brought under
Securities Act section 12 and a similar case brought under Rule 10b-5.
Justice Blackmun wrote:
The measure of damages in a §12(2) case brought by an
investor who still owns the security involved is rescissory: the
statute permits the defrauded investor to recover the
consideration paid for such security with interest thereon, less the
amount of any income received thereon, upon the tender of such
security. I agree with the Court that tax benefits cannot be
considered either "income" or "consideration." Recovery in a
case brought under §10(b) is governed by §28(a) which, unlike
§12(2), does not set out a specific method of calculating damages.
Rather, §28(a) merely limits recovery to the actual damages on
account of the act complained of. A rescissory measure of
damages may sometimes be appropriate. I agree with the Court
that when rescission is the appropriate remedy tax benefits should
not be taken into account. Normally, however, the proper
measure of damages in a §10(b) case is an investor's out-of-pocket
loss, that is, the difference between the fair value of all that [the
plaintiff] received and the fair value of what4 he would have
received had there been no fraudulent conduct.
Justice Blackmun then stated that the out-of-pocket measure
takes into account all the elements that go into the price of a tax
shelter. Essentially, Justice Blackmun stated that an investor in a tax
shelter bargains for potential tax benefits as well as for an underlying
asset. Therefore, it may be proper in a case brought solely under
Rule lOb-5 to limit the recovery to the portion of the purchase price

47
48

Id. at 663 (quotingJanigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir. 1965)).
Id. at 667 (Blackmun,J., concurring) (citing Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 155).
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attributable to payment for the asset that the investor never
received."
An investor who receives the promised tax benefits, but not the
promised income stream or appreciation, of course has been
injured. But this injury-the difference between the value of what
he received and the value of what he was promised-is
represented, not by the entire purchase price, but rather by that
portion of the purchase price which went toward a high quality
underlying asset when what was received was a lower quality asset.
In other words, the investor received the benefit of his bargain
with respect to that part of the purchase price which went toward
buying the tax benefits. The proper measure of recovery in such
a case is therefore the part of the purchase price attributable to
payment for an asset that was never received.
The Court
recognizes that it may be proper to reduce recovery in cases
brought solely under §10(b) and involving securities as to which
tax consequences provided a major inducement to investment,
and I therefore join its opinion.5s
Affiliated Ute was a seller's suit; Randall was a buyer's suit. The
damage measures and principles developed in these two cases,
however, can apply equally to buyers and to sellers.
III. FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS
In light of the discussion above, the federal circuit and district
courts have been faced with a dilemma. The governing statute offers
little guidance as to how to measure or apply section 28(a)'s standard
of "actual damages" to a specific private action under Rule 10b-5. In
addition, the two leading Supreme Court cases addressing this issue,
Affiliated Ute and Randall enumerate at least three possible measures
of damages: out-of-pocket, windfall, and rescissory, which may be
applicable to a particular Rule lOb-5 action. Moreover, the Supreme
Court gave no indication that this articulated list of possible damage
measures is either exhaustive or all-encompassing. As a result, the
circuit and district courts first acknowledge, as the Supreme Court
did in Affiliated Ute and Randall that "[t]he usual measure of damages
for securities fraud claims under Rule lOb-5 is out-of-pocket loss; that
is, the difference between the value of what the plaintiff gave up and
the value of what the plaintiff received.'
The federal circuit and

49 See

id. at 669 (Blackmun,J., concurring).

W Randa// 478 U.S. at 669 (citing Salcer v. Envicon Equities Corp., 744 F.2d
935,
940 n.5 (2d Cir. 1984)).
51 Ambassador Hotel Co. v. Wei-Chuan Inv.,
189 F.3d 1017, 1030 (9th Cir. 1999).
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district courts, however, then digress into alternative measures of
damages that sometimes consist of combining the out-of-pocket
measure with an additional measure or measures as in Affiliated Ute or
using a basically different measure as in Randall." In this section, we
will analyze the damages measures in a number of these court
opinions, including the out-of-pocket measure, the benefit-of-thebargain measure, disgorgement, unjust enrichment or the
constructive trust measure, consequential damages, and other
measures. Although divided by type, the reader should appreciate
that the categories are imprecise and tend to overlap.
A. Out-of-Pocket Measure
In Ansin v. River Oaks Furniture, Inc.,53 the directors of a close
corporation fraudulently repurchased a shareholder's interest in the
company a number of months before taking the company public.54
There was a failure to disclose material information about the
contemplated initial public offering (IPO), including negotiations
with an investment banking firm and valuation analyses performed by
the firm . 5 The materiality of the discussions with the investment
banking firm was shown by evidence that, less than two weeks after
the repurchases in November, 1992, management was looking at a
July or August of 1993 IPO and had adjusted its accounting strategies
accordingly.4 '
The defrauded shareholders sued certain insiders and the
company under Rule lOb-5 and a host of other provisions. 57 With
regard to the Rule lOb-5 claim, the defrauded shareholders were
awarded damages equal to the difference between what they received
for the stock and the twelve dollars per share public offering price."
As in the great majority of Rule lOb-5 damage decisions, at the outset
the First Circuit paid lip service to Affiliated Ute's out-of-pocket
measure and then digressed to articulate its own particular reasoning59
and reach its own particular version of a just measure of damages.
The court's reasoning is worth quoting at length:
52

See id.
N1 105 F.3d 745 (1st Cir. 1997).
. See id. at 748.

" See id. at 750-52.
" See id. at 752.

57

See id. at 748-49. In addition to the § 10(b) claim, the plaintiffs also brought

suit for "conversion, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, common law fraud,
legal malpractice," and state law violations. Id. at 749.
" See id.
.5
See Ansin, 105 F.3d at 757.
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The Supreme Court [in Affiliated Ute] has held that damages
under Rule 10b-5 should be "the difference between the fair value
of all that the.., seller received and the fair value of what he
would have received had there been no fraudulent conduct."...
On the Ansins' securities law claim, the court instructed the jurors
to find "the difference between what the Ansins actually received
for their stock and what you believe they would have received had
they refused to sell or, instead, insisted on different terms." The
jury was told that "the issue is not hindsight," and that they "must
evaluate the Ansins' decision in light of the facts and
circumstances that existed at the time that the decision to sell was
made."
Defendants argue that the district court's jury instructions as to
the damages for the fraud claims were flawed, in that the district
court failed to tell the jury to determine value as of the time of
the fraudulent transaction, i.e., in November 1992. The jury
awarded damages of $12 per share, the public offering price of
River Oaks. This was less than the $17.40 a share which plaintiffs
sought and more than the damages defendants say are the
maximum allowable. Defendants contend that the pre-IPO value
of the company was much lower, and support this contention by
pointing to the immediate resale of the Ansin shares to
knowledgeable insiders at the same price paid to the Ansins.
The federal securities statutes are not explicit as to the proper
measure of damages. Section 28 of the Securities Exchange Act
limits recovery to "actual damages on account of the act
complained of." ... The definition of "actual damages," however,
has been left to the courts. This question presents difficulties,
which are greatest in cases involving closely held securities that
have no readily ascertainable market value. [citing 3 Bromberg &
Lowenfels, Securities Fraud and Commodities Fraud, § 9.1, at 228
(2d ed. 1996).]
The trier of fact may draw reasonable inferences in determining
"fair value," and "isnot restricted to actual sale prices in a market
so isolated and so thin" as one for a close corporation's stock.
[quoting Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 155.] A variety of factors,
including anticipated future appreciation, may affect the value of
stock, so that an appraisal of value "demand[s] a more
sophisticated approach than the simple application of a price
index to the shares."...
Here the very nature of the fraud was to induce the plaintiffs to
sell their stock at a time before the stock would appreciate in
value due to the contemplated IPO and stock split. To adopt
defendants' argument that damages cannot exceed the price of
the shares at the time of the sale would be to reward and
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encourage such chicanery.
Defendants' attempt to limit
plaintiffs' recovery to a hypothetical "market" price as of
November 1992 is unavailing. The trier of fact was entitled to
infer that a reasonable investor, fully informed of the IPO
discussions, including the conditions set by J.C. Bradford
[underwriter], would not have sold his stock in November 1992
for less than his proportionate share of the IPO proceeds.
The anticipated appreciation in the value of the stock was not
unforeseeable. Internal River Oaks documents as to planning and
projections indicated that a 1993 IPO was anticipated. J.C.
Bradford analysts had suggested a range of values for the
company in light of the anticipated IPO, information which was
withheld from the plaintiffs. That these analyses and projections
were, to some extent, contingent does not mean that they are
irrelevant to determining fair value. As another Court of Appeals
has said:
The relevance of the fact [that the defendant close
corporation was involved in merger negotiations] does not
depend on how things turn out. Just as a lie that overstates a
firm's prospects is a violation even if, against all odds, every
fantasy comes true, so a failure to disclose an important
beneficent event is a violation even if things later go sour.
The news . . . allows investors to assess the worth of the

stock.... Investors will either hold the stock or demand a
price that reflects the value of that information. [quoting
Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 440 (7th Cir.
1987).]
In these circumstances, the IPO price was a reasonable
approximation of fair value. We note it was less than the
aftermarket price plaintiffs suggested as damages.
Defendants draw our attention to two district court cases. In
Ross v. Licht [263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)], the court based
damages for failure to disclose IPO plans not on the IPO price,
but on the lower price obtained in an intervening private
placement. However, as one commentary has pointed out, the
court was "probably justified" in using the lower measure because
the private placement was a necessary precondition to the public
offering. [quoting 3 Bromberg & Lowenfels, Securities Fraud and
Commodities Fraud, § 9.1, at 228 n.12 (2d ed. 1996).]
Defendants have pointed to no such determinative intervening
event here. Defendants also point to Hutt v. Dean Witter Reynolds
Inc. [737 F. Supp. 128 (D. Mass. 1990)]. In Hutt, the accretion in
value was due to the stock's trading in a public market over time.
The court accordingly found plaintiffs' potential profits to be "too
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speculative .... " Here, by contrast, plaintiffs point to a specific,
planned-for event.f
By finding the value of plaintiffs' stock at the time they sold to be
the same as the later IPO price, the Ansin jury effectively awarded
plaintiffs a windfall measure of damages: the profits the defendants
61
obtained or could obtain when they resold the shares in the IPO.
B. Benefit-of-the-Bargain Measure
Benefit of the bargain damages may be awarded in Rule 1Ob-5
cases if they can be established with reasonable certainty. 62 In
McMahan & Co. v. Wherehouse Entertainment, Inc.,6 plaintiffs alleged
that one of the important selling points of debentures they had
purchased from the company was a promised redemption at par plus
6.25% if a consolidation or merger occurred that was not approved
by a majority of independent directors." A merger occurred and the
company refused to redeem the debentures, claiming directors'
approval.65 Plaintiffs sued, alleging that the documents offering the
debentures were materially misleading, that the right of redemption
had been portrayed as valuable and creating a duty on the part of the
"independent directors" to act in the debentureholders' interests,
and that this right had proved to be illusory. 6 The Second Circuit
held that if the investors could establish, under their theory of the
case, that independent directors acting on behalf of the
debentureholders would not have approved the merger, then
damages could be assessed at the promised redemption of par plus
6.25%. The court's reasoning is an interesting summary of the law
addressing benefit-of-the-bargain damages under Rule 1Ob-5. The
Second Circuit wrote:
Section 28(a) of the 1934 Act provides that "no person permitted
to maintain a suit for damages under the provisions of this
chapter shall recover ...a total amount in excess of his actual
damages on account of the act complained of." [quoting 15
U.S.C. 78(b)(b).] The statute does not prescribe a particular
W Id. at 758-59 (footnotes omitted).
61 See id.
62

See Laurence A. Steckman & Charles J. Hecht, 1998 Securities Arbitration

Remedies, 1131 PLI/CoRP. 903, 914-15 (1999).
63 65 F.3d 1044 (2d
Cir. 1995).
4A See id. at
1046-47.
65 See id. ("Wherehouse refused to redeem the Debentures at this
price, claiming
that the right to tender had not been triggered because the Board had approved the
merger.").
See id. at 1047.
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method of calculating damages, and, in fact, we have allowed
benefit-of-the-bargain damages under section 10... and Rule
1Ob-5 promulgated thereunder.
In Osofsky v. Zipf [645 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1981)], the plaintiffs
were offered a specific price if they tendered their common stock
in connection with a tender offer. Plaintiffs tendered their stock,
but received a lesser amount than they originally had been
offered.... We held that benefit-of-the-bargain damages, under
Rule lOb-5, were particularly appropriate in the context of tender
offers where, despite the fraud, the shareholders normally will
receive an amount in excess of market value.... We noted that
the key to awarding benefit-of-the-bargain damages is the degree
of certainty to which they can be established....
In Levine v. Seilon, Inc. [439 F.2d 328, 334 (2d Cir. 1971) (Judge
Friendly)] the court stated that, under Rule lOb-5, a defrauded
buyer of securities "was entitled to recover only the excess of what
he paid over the value of what he got, not, as some other courts
had held, the difference between the value of what he got and
what it was represented he would be getting." In Osofsky, we
noted that this language in Levine was dicta, and we distinguished
Levine on the ground that damages sustained by a defrauded
buyer of securities are more speculative and thus different from
the damages of a defrauded seller who does not get what he was
promised.... In cases following Osofsky, we have focused on the
plaintiff's ability to establish benefit-of-the-bargain damages with
some reasonable degree of certainty. For example, in Barrows v.
Forest Labs, Inc. [742 F.2d 54, 59-60 (2d Cir. 1984)], we refused to
allow benefit-of-the-bargain damages where such damages were
based on the speculation of what plaintiff's securities would have
been worth if the company had disclosed its true financial
forecast. More recently, in Commercial Union Assurance Co. v.
Milken [17 F.3d 608, 614-15 (2d Cir. 1984)], we acknowledged the
possibility of awarding benefit-of-the-bargain damages in a Rule
lOb-5 case, but declined to do so because the plaintiff's claims
were speculative.
In this case, we believe that plaintiffs could establish benefit-ofthe-bargain damages with reasonable certainty. We acknowledge,
however, that this is not a case like Osofsky, where plaintiffs were
offered a certain price during a tender offer and then received
some lesser amount. In this case, plaintiffs purchased debentures,
allegedly relying in part on the possibility that a merger that was
not approved by the Independent Directors might occur and thus
trigger the right to tender. This possibility, we have previously
held, could reasonably be considered a "valuable right" to
plaintiffs. [citing McMahon I, 900 F.2d 576, 579 (2d Cir. 1990).]
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Whether plaintiffs can establish with a reasonable degree of
certainty, the amount of that value is a different question.
Plaintiffs contend that determining damages in this case is a
simple task-upon a merger, they are entitled to 106.25% of par
for each Debenture. In reality, the matter is more complex than
plaintiffs' contention would indicate. Because the value of
plaintiffs' right to tender was contingent on the occurrence of
certain events, the value of this right is somewhat speculative.
Nevertheless, if plaintiffs could establish, under their theory of
the case, that independent directors, acting on behalf of the
debentureholders, would not have approved this merger, then
damages could be assessed at the promised redemption of par
plus 6.25%. v
C. Disgorgement, Unjust Enrichment, or Constructive Trust Measure
Disgorgement damages may be recovered in private actions
under Rule 10b-5 based primarily on a theory that the defendant was
unjustly enriched.6
These damages are sometimes referred to as
windfall damages for the plaintiff.
Disgorgement damages are
typically measured by a buyer defendant's profits upon resale as in
Affiliated Ute and Janiganv. Taylor.69

67 Id. at 1049-50 (internal citations omitted). For additional Rule
10b-5 cases not
discussed in McMahan that follow McMahan's test of awarding benefit-of-the-bargain
damages only if they can be established with reasonable certainty, see International

Motor Sports Group, Inc. v. Gordon, No. 82709, 98 CIV 5611(MBM), 1999 WL 619633

(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 1999) (finding that benefit of bargain damages cannot be
established by a buyer with requisite degree of certainty based on the facts at bar;
motion to strike benefit of bargain damages was granted); EdwardJ DeBartolo Corp. v.
Coopers & Lybrand, 928 F. Supp. 557 (W.D. Pa. 1996) (determining that the plaintiff
cannot recover benefit of the bargain damages from a defendant who was not a party
to the underlying contract and, therefore, stock purchasers were limited to
recovering their out-of-pocket losses in Rule lOb-5 claims brought against an
accounting firm); Panos v. Island Gem Enterprises, Ltd., NV, 880 F. Supp. 169 (S.D.N.Y.
1995) (concluding that purchasers of apartment leases for a Caribbean resort could
not recover benefit-of-the-bargain damages under Rule lOb-5 on the basis of the
seller's alleged concealment of a flaw in the title to the property in connection with
their initial purchases; further, such damages would be speculative, since there was
no basis on which to calculate, with reasonable certainty, what the leases would have
been worth had the representations of granting full and clear property rights been
true).
See Patrick Diaz & Rosemary Maxwell, Insider Trading and the CorporateAcquirer:
PrivateActions UnderRule 1Ob-5 Against Agents Who Trade on MisappropriatedInformation,
56 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 600, 650 (1988). The authors explain that "to the extent that
damages in a private cause of action under Rule lOb-5 should be assessed to prevent
unjust enrichment, the plaintiff should be entitled to disgorgement of the
defendant's profits." Id.
344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir. 1965); see also Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 491
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Disgorgement damages were demanded by a buyer, but not
awarded in Commercial Union Assurance Co. v. Milken." In Commercial
Union, plaintiffs who recovered more than their investment had no
damages and could not recover either under Rule lOb-5, Securities
Act section 12(2), or RICO.7 '

The plaintiffs had invested $10.5

million for interests in a limited partnership organized by Ivan F.
Boesky, Michael Milken, and others to engage in arbitrage. The
plaintiffs claimed nondisclosure of the criminal acts of Boesky and
Milken.' During the next five years, plaintiffs received distributions
from the partnership's liquidating trustee equal to 114.6% of their
plaintiffs
investment and still owned their partnership interests. 7 The
74
unsuccessfully argued three theories of Rule 1Ob-5 damage:
(1) They were out-of-pocket compared to the 9% prejudgment
75i
interest that they should have received at New York's statutory rate.
The Second Circuit's response was that the trial court had broad
discretion whether to award prejudgment interest and could properly
conclude that the 14.6% excess return to plaintiffs was a suitable
substitute for prejudgment interest76
(2) They were entitled to the benefit of their bargain, calculated by
extrapolating the partnership's rate of return during its first three
months and supported by returns of other arbitrage firms in the same
period." The court replied that the reasonable certainty required for
benefit-of-the-bargain damages was missing. 8
(3) They were entitled to disgorgement from defendants. The court
stated that the theory would require plaintiffs to prove that
defendants' profits from their $10.5 million investment exceeded the
amount defendants had already disgorged. Since Milken had agreed
to pay a total of $1.1 billion, the theory bordered on frivolous. The
disgorgement to the SEC left 79no unjust enrichment on which to base
disgorgement in a private suit.

F.2d 402, 416-17 (3d Cir. 1973).
7) 17 F.3d 608, 611 (2d Cir. 1994).
71 See id. at 613-15.
72 See id. ("The crux of the [plaintiffs'] theory ...is that had they known about
the criminal activities of Boesky and the Milkens ...they would not have purchased
their partnership interests.").
73

See id.at 611.

74

See id.
See id.at 614.

75

See Commercial Union, 17 F.3d at 613-14.
n See id.
at 614-15.

76
78

See id.at 615.

7 See id.(citing Litton Indus., Inc. v. Lehman Bros., Huhn Loeb Inc., 734 F.
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The constructive trust measure-gauged by the defendant's
profit rather than the plaintiff's out-of-pocket loss-applies only to
insider trading cases, where it has been described as disgorgement.
In Litton Industries, Inc. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc.,"' an open
market buyer of, and tender offeror for, Itek shares was allowed to
recover (in an implied private action) the profits of the defendants,
who traded Itek shares with tipped, material, nonpublic information
about the planned tender offer. "'
However, amounts already
disgorged to the SEC were subtracted."" Recovery of already SECdisgorged profits would go beyond the unjust enrichment rationale
for disgorgement and amount to impermissible punitive damages."4
It is clear that the underlying purpose of allowing disgorgement
as an exception to the traditional out-of-pocket measure is to
prevent unjust enrichment. Thus, the Court finds that once illgotten gains have been disgorged to the SEC, there remains no
unjust enrichment and, therefore, no basis for further
disgorgement in a private action8 5
There was a fact question whether all profits had been disgorged in
the SEC litigation. The offeror alleged that it had to bid higher in
the tender offer because the defendants' trading inflated the market
price of Itek securities.
A bank engaged in insider trading was required to disgorge, in
addition to its own trading profits (less SEC disgorgement), the fees
and commissions it received on the purchase and sale of Itek
securities by itself and its officers and employees with tipped material,
nonpublic information about the planned tender offer."' The bank
was permitted to offset the commissions it paid to third-party brokers
on the trades8 7
In Wilson v. Great American Industries, Inc.,m a buyer defendant's
profit (rather than seller plaintiffs loss) measure of damages was

Supp. 1071, 1076 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)).
80 See William R. McLucas & Joseph I. Goldstein, Recent SEC Enforcement
Developments, 417 PLI/LIT. 163, 198-99 (1991) (discussing SEC v. Levine et al., 881
F.2d 1165 (2d Cir. 1989)).
8' 734 F. Supp. 1071 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
2See id. at 1073, 1075-76.

See id. at 1076.
See id.

Id.

8
86

87

See id. at 1077.
See Littleton Indus., 734 F. Supp. at 1077.

S979 F.2d 924 (2d Cir. 1992).

2000]

RULE 10b-5

1101

applied.'m This we have described as a constructive trust measure and
also as a windfall measure. The court described it as the benefit-ofthe-bargain measure from Janigan,O which held that "a shareholder
induced by fraud into selling his shares for less than fair
consideration may recover future accretions in value of the stock,
even if those damages are not foreseeable." 9 The court also cited
Affiliated Ute, summarized as "where defendant receives more than
seller's actual loss, damages are the amount of defendant's profit.""2
In Wilson, plaintiffs were minority shareholders squeezed out in
a merger with a 73% shareholder by means of a misleading proxy
statement. 93 Arguably, they lost their state law appraisal rights by
voting for the merger or by failing to make timely dissent. The court
expressed its rationale as giving the plaintiffs what they would have
received if full disclosure had resulted in a better consideration in the
merger.
But to place plaintiffs in substantially the same position they
would have occupied absent the fraud, they should be entitled to
the profits attributable to the extra stock they would have received
had the proxy statement provided a fair exchange ratio.
Although the fraud may not be the proximate cause of the
merger, it did cause the forfeiture of appraisal rights, which in
turn prevented plaintiffs from realizing a fair exchange ratio.
Thus the injury caused by the fraud cannot be measured by the
shares that were exchanged, rather by the value of the additional
shares that should have been exchanged but because of the fraud
94
were not.
A defendant's profits from a violation can limit a plaintiff's
recovery in some instances. In Hutt v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc.,95 a
customer selling to a broker-dealer market maker a security that later
rose significandy in value has been limited to the broker-dealer's
profit as a cap on the plaintiff s "actual damages.""' "[I]f the alleged
fraud . . . has not resulted in any benefit to the defendant, then
calculation of the potential profits the plaintiff would have enjoyed
absent the defendant's action is too speculative to permit recovery. "-7
See id. at 932-33.
See id. at 932 (citingJanigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 871, 786-87).
91 Janigan,344 F.2d at 786-87.
IY2 Wilson, 979 F.2d at 932 (quoting Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 155).
Nq

90

See id. at 926.
Id. at 932-33.
"
"

97

737 F. Supp. 128 (D. Mass. 1990).
See id. at 133.
Id.
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The plaintiff alleged that the broker-dealer made misrepresentations
to induce him to sell the stock and failed to disclose that the firm
would make a commission or markup on the sale of the stock.' The
court allowed discovery to determine what, if any, profits the brokerdealer made.
D. ConsequentialDamages
Consequential damages (special damages) are available under°°
Rule 10b-5 if their relationship to the defendant is not too remote.1
These damages must be shown with reasonable certainty to be caused
by the defendant's violation."' But they are recoverable even if the
no loss on the purchase or sale considered
plaintiff suffered
02
separately.

In Grubb v. FederalDeposit Insurance Corp.,'" a buyer of a bank was
not allowed to recover his $2.5 million of capital contributions; they
were not reasonable measures to minimize his losses since they were
04
made after he knew the bank had $14 million of potential losses.'
In In re Crazy Eddie Securities Litigation,'O certain incidental
expenses incurred were sufficiently connected to Eddie Antar's fraud
so as to constitute consequential damages.' °6 The facts surrounding
the takeover of Crazy Eddie's demonstrated that the individual
plaintiffs were induced by Antar's fraud to purchase Crazy Eddie
stock and to engage in a proxy fight to gain control of the
company. 0 7 On the other hand, certain expenses claimed by the
plaintiff entity after it took control over the management of Crazy
Eddie were too attenuated from Antar's fraud to be recoverable as
consequential damages.'°8

48

See id. at 129.

49 See id. at 135.

,W See Meyers v. Moody, 693 F.2d 1196, 1212 (5th Cir. 1982).
101 See, e.g., James v. Meinke, 778 F.2d 200, 205 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that
consequential damages are recoverable under Rule lOb-5 if the plaintiff can prove
with reasonable certainty that the fraud caused the damages); see also Foster v.
Financial Tech. Inc., 517 F.2d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 1975) ("[P]laintiffs' burden on
the issue of causation is not a light one.").
1M See Moody, 693 F.2d at 1212.
10s
868 F.2d 1151 (10th Cir. 1989).
IN See id. at 1165-67.

948 F. Supp. 1154 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
IM See id. at 1173-74.
107 See id. at 1165.
105

WSaSeeid. at 1174.
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In Three Crown Limited Partnership v. Salomon Brothers,'0 a
securities trader alleging manipulation of the market for Treasury
notes was unable to maintain its claim for consequential damages."0
Plaintiff tried to recover profits it would have earned trading the
notes on a "butterfly strategy" during a seven-month period but for
defendant's manipulation of the market."'
Moreover, plaintiff
claimed that it would have earned additional profits during the
immediately following eleven-month period had it reinvested the
profits gleaned from its "butterfly strategy" in an unmanipulated
market. ' 2 The court rejected both of these damage claims as too
speculative because
they were based on trades never negotiated and
3
made."
never
E. Other Measures
Perhaps it is appropriate to conclude this section with the Ninth
Circuit's opinion in Ambassador Hotel Co. v. Wei-Chuan Investment,"4
which covers a number of possible measures of damages under Rule
10b-5 and then remands for the district court to solve the specific
problem.
In Ambassador Hotel, alleged fraudulent misrepresentations were
made in the course of negotiating a joint venture agreement. 5 The
statement induced a hotel company to invest in a joint venture to
construct a hotel in exchange for stock in the construction
company." 6 The fraud related to the value of the stock. The district
court erred in finding that the stock had no value. The Ninth
Circuit's opinion with respect to the measure of damages is an
interesting compendium of the present multifarious state of the law
of damages under Rule 1Ob-5.
Defendants argue that the district court improperly awarded
Ambassador [hotel company] double recovery, in that
Ambassador received in damages the full measure of its lost
investment in the project and also retained its stock in Kopin
[construction company], which received the separate award of
$14 million. We agree.

09 906 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
10 See id. at 889-90.
II See id. at 883.
112 See id. at 882.
"s
14
"15

116

See id. at 886.

189 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 1999).

See id. at 1021-24.
See id.
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Section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides,
in relevant part:
"[T]he rights and remedies provided by this chapter...
shall be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies
that may exist at law or in equity; but no person permitted to
maintain a suit for damages under the provisions of this
chapter shall recover, through satisfaction of judgment in
one or more actions, a total amount in excess of his actual
damages on account of the act complained of."
In Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States.... the Supreme
Court "clearly interpreted §28(a) as governing the measure of
damages that are permissible under §10(b)." [quoting Randa/,
478 U.S. at 663.] Neither section 10(b) nor Rule 10b-5 sets forth
any more specific measure of damages.
The usual measure of damages for securities fraud claims under
Rule 10b-5 is out-of-pocket loss; that is, the difference between the
value of what the plaintiff gave up and the value of what the
plaintiff received. Consequential damages may also be awarded if
proved with sufficient certainty. [citing DCD Programs v.
Leighton, 90 F.3d 1442, 1449 (9th Cir. 1996).]
The general rule allows plaintiffs defrauded in violation of
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to recover the difference
between the value of the consideration they gave and the
value of the security they received, plus consequential
damages that can be proved with reasonable certainty to
have resulted from the fraud.
[Arrington v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 651 F.2d
615, 621 (9th Cir. 1981).]
The district court may apply a rescissory measure of damages in
appropriate circumstances. [citing DCD programs, 90 F.3d at 1449;
Arrington, 651 F.2d at 621; Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 909
(9th Cir. 1975).]
In the proceedings below, the district court applied a modified
out-of-pocket measure. Ambassador paid $8.4 million for its
shares of Kopin stock. The district court valued the Kopin stock
at zero, measured at the time of the discovery of the fraud, or the
time Ambassador learned of the structural defects in the hotel
shell. Consequently, the court arrived at an out-of-pocket figure
of $8.4 million. The court then added consequential damages of
$[500,000], because Ambassador spent that amount in an attempt
to mitigate the harm it suffered. Thus, the court awarded
Ambassador $8.9 million in compensatory damages.
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However, the district court erred. The Kopin stock did not have
zero value at the time the fraud was discovered. At that time,
defendants had already siphoned off millions from the Kopin
bank account and had fraudulently caused Kopin to sign the loan
assumption, making Kopin liable for the entire $10 million loan,
due and payable within six months. Thus, at that time, Kopin had
valid legal claims against defendants. These unadjudicated claims
were corporate assets; unadjudicated claims held by a corporation
are among its assets and may materially affect the value of the
corporation's stock. [citing Affiiated Ute, 406 U.S. at 154-56.]
Thus, the district court erred in setting the value of the Kopin
stock at zero.
Alternatively, the award to Ambassador can be seen as an award
under the rescissory measure of damages. Rescission reverses the
fraudulent transaction and returns the parties to the position they
occupied prior to the fraud. It restores the status quo ante.
Under true rescission, the plaintiff returns to the defendant the
subject of the transaction, plus any other benefit received under
the contract, and the defendant returns to the plaintiff the
consideration furnished, plus interest. [citing Green v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1342 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J.,
concurring); D. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 9.3(3) (2d ed. 1993).]
If true rescission is no longer possible (perhaps because the
plaintiff no longer owns the subject of the sale), the court may
order its monetary equivalent. This remedy entitles the plaintiff
to the return of the consideration paid less any value received on
the investment. [citing Volk v. D.A. Davidson & Co., 816 F.2d
1406, 1413 (9th Cir. 1987).]
In this case, under the district court's order, Ambassador was
awarded damages equivalent to its full investment in Kopin, but
was also allowed to keep the Kopin stock. Ambassador was not
required to tender the stock or otherwise account for the benefit
it received.
This result violates the principle of rescission.
Ambassador may not receive the full purchase price of the stock
and also retain the stock itself. The stock now has considerable
value, since the district court has awarded Kopin judgment on its
claims against defendants.
True rescission is not available in this case, since it would
require the dissolution of Kopin.
Also, it would not be
appropriate to order that Ambassador turn the Kopin stock back
to WCC [the defendants who induced Ambassador to invest in
Kopin], since WCC did not sell the stock to Ambassador. In turn,
it would not be appropriate to require Ambassador to tender the
stock to Kopin; if that occurred, WCC would own all outstanding
Kopin stock, which does have some value, and thus WCC would
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benefit from its own wrongdoing. Therefore, the monetary
equivalent of rescission should be awarded if the district court
opts to proceed under this theory of relief. Ambassador should
not be required to give up its Kopin stock. However, under the
rescissory measure, the damage award to Ambassador must be
offset by the value of the Kopin stock, including any money
judgment awarded to Kopin in this case.
Under either measure of damages, the $8.9 million damage award
overcompensates Ambassador.
Therefore, the compensatory

damage award should be vacated. 117

For another decision showing great flexibility and lack of
adherence to any specific rules with respect to both the measure and
the allocation of damages under Rule 10b-5, see Arthur Young & Co.
v. Jves.'18

A cash flow measure of damages was considered but rejected in

Koch v. Koch Industries, Inc."9
IV. FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT CONFUSION
Any analysis of the subject of compensatory damage awards
under Rule IOb-5 would not be complete without some representative
examples of the reactions of the district courts around the country to
the lack of guidelines and general confusion in this area.
In Koch v. Koch Industries, Inc., the court held that "[d]amages by
the cash flow method" was an inappropriate measure of damages in a
minority shareholders' Rule 10b-5 action against a corporation which
alleged that the corporation failed to make certain disclosures before
buying out the minority interests. The shareholders were entitled to
recover only their actual loss, that is, the difference between the "fair
value" of their stock on the date of sale and the price paid for their
stock. The "cash flow method," which was based on what the
corporation could afford to borrow and pay back from its cash flows,
focused not on what the stock was worth, but rather, on what the
corporation could afford to pay for the stock. This "cash flow
method," therefore, was rejected.
The court then proceeded to summarize the existing state of the
law with respect to Rule 10b-5 damages. The court wrote:
Anyone researching the issue of Rule 10b-5 damages would be
immediately confronted with the repeated observation that this is

117

118
119

Id. at 1030-31.
937 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1991).
6 F. Supp.2d 1192, 1204-07 (D. Kan. 1998).
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a confused area of the law where the courts, forced to rely on
their own wits, have crafted a myriad of approaches. [citing DCD
Programs, 90 F.3d at 1446.]
In a footnote, the court observed that:
Commentators almost universally agree on this observation.
[citing 3B HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF,
SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAw § 9.49(1) (1989); IX
Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 4410
(1992); Andrew L. Merritt, A Consistent Model of Loss Causation in
Securities Fraud Litigation: Suiting the Remedy to the Wrong,66 TEX.
L. REV. 469, 469-70 (1988).]
In the same footnote, the court also quoted one commentator
who,
20
in the court's words, "summed up the situation quite astutely":1
The measure of recovery in a Rule 10b-5 action always has been
confusing. Not coincidentally, it always has been an afterthought
in Rule lOb-5 case law. Litigants seeking to establish the existence
and then the elements of a private cause of action under Rule
10b-5 were content to leave the measure of recovery to be
resolved another day. In almost all cases "another day" never
came as cases settled without the need to precisely define the
measure of recovery. In those cases where the courts have been
forced to state a measure, they have provided a bewildering mix
of standards, often using the same terms, but frequently giving
them radically different interpretations and doing little to resolve
the inconsistencies. For those cases that made it to the end,
judges seemed more partial to providing rough justice than to
establishing a clean theoretical formula for recovery.
Returning to its analysis, the court wrote:
Section 28 of the Securities Exchange Act limits recovery "to
actual damages on account of the act complained of."... Because
Congress left actual damages undefined, "it is the duty of the
courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to
make effective [the] congressional purpose" behind the securities
statutes. [citing J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964);
Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1121 (10th Cir. 1982)
(holding that the trial court has discretion to fashion "a remedy
to suit the particular case").] "Courts have interpreted the statute
as permitting all forms of loss-based relief, whether articulated
under out-of-pocket, benefit-of-the-bargain, or other loss
theories." [quoting Panos v. Island Gem Enterprises, Ltd., N.V.,
Id. at 120 2 n .6 .
121 Id. (quoting Robert B. Thompson,
"Simplicity and Certainty" inthe Measure of
Recovery Under Rule IOb-5, 51 Bus. LAw 1177, 1179 (1996)).
120
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880 F.Supp. 169, 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); see also Sowell v. Butcher &
Singer, Inc., 926 F.2d 289, 297 (3d Cir. 1991).] In sum, courts
routinely understand "actual damages" to be out-of-pocket losses
[citing Anixter v. Home-Stake Prods. Co., 977 F.2d 1549, 1553
(10th Cir. 1992); Astor Chauffeured Limousine Co. v. Runnfeldt
Inv. Corp., 910 F.2d 1540, 1551-52 (7th Cir. 1990); Garnatz v.
Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., Inc., 559 F.2d 1357, 1360 (8th Cir. 1977)],
but they have varied that measure or looked to other measures
when the facts required it. [citing Pelletier v. Stuart-James Co.,
Inc., 863 F.2d 1550, 1557-58 (11th Cir.); Garnatz, 559 F.2d at 1360;
Hackbart, 675 f.2d at 1121.] 122
23
In In re Clearly Canadian Securities Litigation,1
a federal district
court in California confronted with the problem of approving two
fraud-on-the-market class action settlements articulated the following
harsh criticism of the method of measuring compensatory damages
under Rule lOb-5:
The difficulty in performing an accurate out of pocket damage
calculation is, in and of itself, cause to question the rationality of
the out of pocket measure of damages in open market cases.

Even when statistical analysis identifies a reasonably accurate
measure of a fraud's impact on the stock price, current damage
calculations make a number of problematic assumptions in the
estimation of the harm inflicted by that price distortion. For
example, use of the first in, first out [FIFO] method of pairing
purchases and sales of shares will identify damages where in
reality there may be none; the FIFO assumption is in no way
based on actual trading practices in general, let alone the trades
of actual claimants.
Similarly, the choice between constant shares versus constant
dollars damage calculations is a choice between two potentially
valid but diametrically opposed assumptions. The constant shares
method assumes that, absent the alleged wrongdoing, the investor
would have purchased the same number of shares for less money
while the constant dollars method assumes he would have spent
the same amount of money and purchased more shares. While
the latter theory is generally presumed to be a more accurate
description of actual practice, it is inherently misdescriptive of a
certain portion of the investing population.
The difficulty of identifying the number of shares in the class is
the most fundamental problem confronting a rational calculation

122

Id.

Nos. C-93-1037-VRW, C-93-1278-VRW, C-93-4313-VRW, C-95-0699-VRW, C-952295-VRW, 993, 1999 WL 707737 at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 1999).
123
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of out of pocket damages. Investors who have both bought and
sold during the class period are not entitled to recover their
overpayment for inflated shares because they received a windfall
when they sold at a price still inflated by the misrepresentation or
omission. The need to estimate and discount such trades, and to
compensate for irregularities in reporting conventions and
market structures, presents a substantial barrier to the
development and application of accurate proportional decay
models and consequently an obstacle to calculating out of pocket
losses.
When, if ever, these initial barriers are overcome, the fact
remains that the out of pocket damage rule-whatever its
theoretical appeal-appears in actual practice to be comprised of
a set of unsupportable assumptions and arbitrary rules that result
in irrational damage awards whether or not the damage
calculation is further corrupted by inaccurate estimation of the
shares in the class and the price change attributable to the fraud.
Absent allegations of insider trading, use of the out of pocket
calculation in open market securities fraud cases targets parties
who, while responsible for the fraud, do not profit directly from
it. Not only does the damage rule seek to penalize a party who
has not profited from the alleged wrongdoing, the penalty
imposed is not rationally related to the social harm inflicted. For
every dollar taken from an injured investor that same dollar is put
in another innocent investor's pocket: every dollar lost by an
investor who pays an inflated price for a stock is gained by the
investor who sold at the inflated price.
The failure to incorporate this fact into the damage analysis
results in a systematic over estimation of the social harm inflicted.
Indeed, the out of pocket damage rule is not a damage rule at all.
It is a wealth transfer formula whose impact is punitive in nature.
It measures neither the harm to society nor the wrongful benefits
to the alleged wrongdoers.
Moreover, the principal beneficiaries of securities litigation are
likely larger, institutional stock traders who are also more likely to
be beneficiaries of windfall fraud on the market profits. The first
point is simply a result of a presumption that sophisticated stock
traders with large holdings will be more likely to file claims than
the average individual investor and will therefore recover a higher
percentage of their losses. The second point is true because the
heavy volume and diverse exposure of institutional transactions
makes institutional stock traders more likely to capture the
benefit of selling at an inflated price.
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Because the cost of securities fraud litigation is already spread
across the market through the cost of insurance and through
diversified portfolios, these surmises suggest that securities class
action litigation simply transfers wealth from individual investors
to institutional stock traders. Moreover, the goal of deterrence is
lost in the sea of grossly overstated damage claims and the
resulting comprehensive insurance coverage and indemnification
agreements issuers have with their officers and directors [sic].
Litigation which fails effectively to deter wrongdoing and simply
transfers wealth more or less randomly from one group to
another (with a major cut for the lawyer intermediaries) must be
questioned.
And so, the court is faced with the dilemma of being asked to
approve settlements that were reached on the basis of damage
estimates and allocations that grossly failed accurately to
anticipate actual claimed damages, estimates based on a theory of
damages that bears no relationship to actual economic harm or
the alleged wrongdoer profit and in fact likely results [in] a
random but large multiple of social harm or wrongdoer gain.
Nonetheless, approval of the settlements and their respective
plans of allocation seems unquestionably in conformity with and
perhaps even mandated by the current state of the law. In the
absence of credible academic criticism or objections from class
members or other interested parties, the court has no reasonable
alternative but to approve the settlements.124
For similar criticism, see Queen Uno Ltd. Partnership v. Couer
D'Alene Mines Corp. 25 In Queen Uno, the court wrote:
Defendants' main argument is that Mr. Giedt [the plaintiff] was
not damaged and is therefore atypical. It appears that during the
class period, Mr. Giedt purchased 1000 shares of stock at $21.375
per share. During the class period, he also sold 1000 shares of
stock at $24.25 per share. Thus, Mr. Giedt made, and did not
lose, money during the class period.... Defendants contend he is
subject to the unique defense that he has no damages and thus
has no standing to sue. Defendants also contend that he conflicts
with class members who did not sell during the period, but who
bought in February 1996, when the stock was at its high point.
However, as Plaintiffs correctly point out, in a Rule lOb-5 action,
damages are determined by the out of pocket rule. The out of
pocket rule dictates that damages are determined between the
stock purchase price and the true value of the stock at the date of
purchase. [citing Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d
124

Id. at *4-*5.

125

183 F.R.D. 687 (D. Colo. 1998).
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1433, 1436-37 (9th Cir. 1987).] Thus, Mr. Giedt only needs to
prove that Defendants artificially inflated the price he paid for the
stock at the time he bought the stock through their material
misrepresentations. This means that Mr. Giedt was damaged. 26
V. SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT

§ 21D(e)

The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 includes a
new provision with respect to a limitation on the calculation of
damages in private actions under the 1934 Act. 2 7 Section 21D(e)
reads as follows:
(e) Limitation on Damages
(1)In General. Except as provided in paragraph (2), in any
private action arising under this title in which the plaintiff
seeks to establish damages by reference to the market price
of a security, the award of damages to the plaintiff shall not
exceed the difference between the purchase or sale price
paid or received, as appropriate, by the plaintiff for the
subject security and the mean trading price of that security
during the 90-day period beginning on the date on which
the information correcting the misstatement or omission
that is the basis for the action is disseminated to the market.
(2)Exception. In any private action arising under this title
in which the plaintiff seeks to establish damages by reference
to the market price of a security, if the plaintiff sells or
repurchases the subject security prior to the expiration of
the 90-day period described in paragraph (1), the plaintiff's
damages shall not exceed the difference between the
purchase or sale price paid or received, as appropriate, by
the plaintiff for the security and the mean trading price of
the security during the period beginning immediately after
dissemination of information correcting the misstatement or
omission and ending on the date on which the plaintiff sells
or repurchases the security.
(3)Definition. For purposes of this subsection, the 'mean
trading price' of a security shall be an average of the daily
trading price of that security, determined as of the close of
the market each day during the 90-day period referred to in
paragraph (1). 1,2

1i2
127
128

See id. at 693.
See Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737, 749-50 (1995).
..
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The Conference Report included the following explanatory
statement:
The current method of calculating damages in 1934 Act
securities fraud cases is complex and uncertain. As a result, there
are often substantial variations in the damages calculated by the
defendants and the plaintiffs. Typically, in an action involving a
fraudulent misstatement or omission, the investor's damages are
presumed to be the difference between the price the investor
paid for the security and the price of the security on the day the
corrective information gets disseminated to the market.
Between the time a misrepresentation is made and the time the
market receives corrected information . . . the price of the

security may rise or fall for reasons unrelated to the alleged fraud.
According to an analysis provided to the Senate Securities
Subcommittee, on average, damages in securities litigation
comprise approximately 27.7[%] of market loss. Calculating
damages based on the date corrective information is disclosed
may end up substantially overestimating plaintiffs damages.
[citing Baruch Lev & Meirind de Villiers, Stock Price Crashes and
lOb-5 Damages: A Legal, Economic, and Policy Analysis, 47 STAN. L.

REv. 7, 9-11 (1994).]
The Conference Committee intends to rectify the uncertainty in
calculating damages in new section 21D(e) of the 1934 Act by
providing a "look back" period, thereby limiting damages to those
losses caused by the fraud and not by other market conditions.
This provision requires that plaintiffs damages be calculated
based on the "mean trading price" of the security.
This
calculation takes into account the value of the security on the date
plaintiff originally bought or sold the security and the value of the
security during the 90-day period after dissemination of any
information correcting the misleading statement or omission.
Thus, on the one hand, section 21D(e) was designed to solve the

problem illustrated in Executive Telecard, Ltd. Securities Litigation,'2 in
which an expert witness' testimony was deemed unreliable because
the expert could not eliminate factors unrelated to the fraud from his
Rule 10b-5 damages calculation.'" At the same time, however, section
21D(e) was designed to eliminate the "crash" element from the Rule
10b-5 damages calculation described in Lev and deVillers' article
cited above by giving the market price of the security a chance to
"bounce back" from its "crash" on the date the misrepresentation was

12

979 F. Supp.2d 1021 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).

3 See Executive Telecard, 979 F. Supp. at 1024-27.
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corrected.'' This allowance for a "bounce back" in price should yield
a more accurate and fairer estimate of the stock's true value and
therefore a more accurate measure of the deviation from this true
value and the resulting damages caused by the fraud.
CONCLUSION

We end where we began. Damage awards in private actions
under Rule lOb-5 may be either an area in which flexibility,
pragmatism, and justice prevail or "a confused area of the law where
the courts, forced to rely on their own wits, have created a myriad of
approaches."'1

,

2

Or perhaps both descriptions are accurate and

together render a more complete description of the state of the law
of compensatory damages under Rule lOb-5. The reader will have to
judge for himself. The Authors, however, would prefer more clarity,
consistency, and predictability in the area.

"5
See S. Rep. No. 104-98 (1995).
.12Koch v. Koch Indus., Inc., 6 F. Supp.2d 1192, 1201 (D. Kan. 1998).

